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MILITARY CHAPLAINS - A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE
By M. ALBERT FIGINSKI*
I. ENGEL; SCHEMPP-MURRAY; JUSTICE BRENNAN
TAKES A STAND
When the Supreme Court held unconstitutional, in
Engel v. Vitale,' a local New York school board require-
ment that each school day be opened with the recitation of
a prayer, authored by the State Board of Regents, by stu-
dents who, if they had taken affirmative action, could have
been excused from this ritual, vehement disapproval and
harsh accusations were heard throughout the country.' As
time progressed and tempers soothed, disagreement, as
well as approval, flowed forth from the more usual com-
mentators on constitutional decisions.3 The sources of dis-
approval, whether reasoned or flamboyant, expressed fears
that the language and approach used by Justice Black in
Engel and the willingness of the Court to intercede in these
matters would have the pervasive effect of eliminating
many religious references and practices which theretofore
had been long sanctioned by American governments on
both the state and Federal level.
The only balm the Court had offered in Engel was foot-
note 21, which appeared as an appendage to what seem-
* B.A., 1959, Johns Hopkins University, 1959 (political science); LL.B.,
1962, University of Maryland School of Law, 1962; Casenote Editor, Mary-
land Law Review, 1961-62; Member, Maryland Bar.
1370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 A catalogue of the attacks voiced is found in Editorial, Religion Spon-
8ored by the State, 4 J. CHURcH & STATE 141, 142 (1962). See also N.Y.L.J.,
April 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 4.
, The Engel case was widely reviewed by the legal periodicals. Perhaps
the most bitter intellectual criticism was Griswold, Absolute 18 in the
Dark - A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitu-
tional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167 (1963). See also Kurland, The
Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . .. ", 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 1. Pfeffer, The New York Regents' Prayer Case, 4 J. CHURCH &STATE 150, 158 (1962) is an ardent argument in favor of the Engel decision.
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ingly was an attempt by the Court to answer any assertion
that its decision was anti-religious.4 Footnote 21 rejected
the assertion that the ruling necessarily forbade classroom
recitation of historical documents or our National Anthem
when they contained references to a Deity or a Supreme
Being.5
If this footnote was the only verbiage that soothed fears
of a pervasive sweep of religion out of our public life, there
were several causes for alarm. Foremost was the factual
context of the case, i.e., the non-denominational content of
the prayer and the non-compulsory attendance at the reci-
tation. Secondly, the entire presentation of the Court im-
plied an absolutist approach which displayed a judicial fear
that any concession to religion or the religious character of
our people' was tantamount to sanctioning a small leak in
a large dam, which confined a restlessness to break forth
on a rampage of European-style Establishment of a Church.'
A third cause for alarm was Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion which saw as the true constitutional evil, not the
governmental writing of a prayer," but the financial aid'
the state rendered a religious exercise by allowing the
praying to be led by a person on the public payroll.10
With its performance in Engel and the reaction thereto
serving as recent history, the Court was faced in its next
Term with the practice of Bible-reading in the opening
exercises of the public schools of Baltimore City and Penn-
sylvania. Again, non-conforming students could be excused
from attendance at the exercises. However, the Court held
I Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962): "It is neither sacrilegious
nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country
should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."
Id. at 435, n. 21.
6 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). See NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND
SECULAR AHI ERICA (1958).
7The EngeZ opinion of Justice Black can also be read narrowly as
strictly limited to the issue in the case. This being so, one wonders whether
much of the uproar that followed the announcement of the decision would
have resulted if the opinion had stopped at p. 425.
1 This was the essence of the constitutional evil according to the ma-
jority. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 429 (1962).
o Cf. an opinion by the Attorney General of the State of Maryland indi-
cating no Federal constitutional bar to a county allowing a local Catholic
parochial school, at its own expense, to tie into the closed circuit educa-
tional television system maintained for the county's public school system.
The essence of the opinion was: "The arrangement . . . would do no more
than provide secular educational opportunities for school children, and
without the expenditure of any additional money by either the State or the
County." (Emphasis added.) The opinion is reported in Daily Record
(Baltimore), Apr. 8, 1964, p. 4, col. 2.
10 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439, 441 (1962).
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in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp and Murray v. Cur-
lett" that the practice was unconstitutional on the basis of
a test that looked to the "purpose and primary effect"'2 of
the legislatively sanctioned ritual and found that the exer-
cises were of a religious character and thus in violation of
the non-establishment of religion provision of the First
Amendment.
In so holding, Justice Clark, writing for the majority,
followed a style of presentation completely different than
Justice Black had demonstrated in Engel. Stressing former
opinions of the Court rather than writing a history of
Church-State relations throughout the centuries, Justice
Clark gave some salve to those who would not have all
religious manifestations in public life erased. The opinion
specifically referred to the oaths of public officials, the
practice of Congressional chaplins, the cry of the Court,
and military manifestations of religion.13 A footnote spe-
cifically excluded the last-mentioned connection of Church
and State from the scope of the opinion. 4
If this were not soothing enough, Justice Brennan, per-
haps in response to the legal reaction to the breadth seen
by many in Engel, wrote a lengthy concurring opinion
which sought to define permissible and impermissible types
of "interdependence between religious and other public
institutions."' 5 Justice Brennan suggested that "religious
exercises in the public school [presented] a unique prob-
lem," and the decisions rendered in cases involving re-
ligion in the public schools are not reliable forecasts for
other areas of Church-State contact. Rejecting the abso-
lutist pose, Justice Brennan stated, ". . . not every invol-
vement of religion in public life . . violates the Establish-
ment Clause.' 1 7 For Brennan, that Clause proscribed only:
"... those involvements of religious with secular in-
stitutions which (a) serve the essentially religious ac-
tivities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs
of government for essentially religious purposes; or
"374 U.S. 203 (1963).
'Id. at 222.
'8 374 U.S. at 213. Of course, mere mention does not imply approval.
"374 U.S. at 226, n. 10. However, see Pfeffer, The Schempp-Murray
Decision on School Prayers and Bible Reading, 5 J. CHURCH & STATE 165,
173-74 (1963), which recognized the Court's attempt to restrict Schempp-
Murray but argued for a pervasive interpretation.
'8 374 U.S. at 294.
"Ibid.
17 374 U.S. at 232. This in Itself can be viewed as a different approach
than that which had been criticized for use in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
19641
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
(c) use essentially religious means to serve govern-
mental ends, where secular means would suffice."'"
There were, however, "forms of accommodation" consis-
tent with a "strict neutrality in matters of religion" which
were not proscribed; indeed, to prohibit them would amount
to "official hostility toward religion."' 9
The first and foremost form of accommodation, for pur-
poses of discussion of the constitutionality of military chap-
lains, was said to arise from a conflict between the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment wherein a strict reading of the former would "ser-
iously interfere"20 with the protections accorded by the
latter. Justice Brennan recognized that the Establish-
ment Clause standing alone is "conceivably" 21 violated by
the practice of providing chaplains to the military. How-
ever, this assumption did not foreclose discussion. It was
argued that providing chaplains had constitutional basis
as "necessary to secure to the members of the Armed
Forces ... those rights of worship guaranteed under the
Free Exercise Clause. '2  Impediments to this theory raised
by the Court's decisions in the religion in school cases were
distinguished away. The lack of coercive attendance, the
adults involved, and the lack of religious opportunity other-
wise were the basis for the distinction. Therefore, to refuse
to allow Congress to provide for military chaplains or the
states to provide for chaplains in the prisons would be
hostility, not neutrality, toward religion.23
Justice Brennan's thesis can be viewed as an answer to
those who felt the Court was wrongly headed toward elim-
inating every aspect of accommodation between Church
and State. The thesis of giving the Free Exercise Clause
precedence over the Establishment Clause and justifying
state action on that basis is not a completely unique one.
In fact, it had been argued to and rejected by the Court in
Schempp. Justice Clark wrote:
"... we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality,
which does not permit a State to require a religious
I' 374 U.S. at 295.
10 Ibid.
20 374 U.S. at 296.
21 Ibid.
22 374 U.S. at 297.
28 374 U.S. at 299. Other areas of accommodation between church and
state said to be allowable by Justice Brennan were legislative chaplains,
non-devotional use of the Bible in public schools, uniform tax exemptions
incidentally available to religious institutions, activities which though
religious in origin have ceased to have religious meaning and religious
considerations in public welfare programs. 374 U.S. st 299-304.
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exercise even with the consent of those . . . affected,
collides with the majority's right to free exercise.
While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the
use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise
to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."24
However, in footnoting this passage the Court noted it was
not faced with and thus did not pass upon the military chap-
laincy question. At least, then, the majority of the Court
remained neutral on this question, but rejected any wide-
ranging use, under normal conditions, by a popular major-
ity of the Free Exercise Clause to sanction state-supported
religious exercises.
Use of the Free Exercise command to sanction state
action in areas where a "doctrinaire reading of the Estab-
lishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the
Free Exercise Clause" 5 was the thesis of Justice Stewart's
dissent which urged remand for further evidence of the
effect, if any, official coercion had on non-participants in
the exercises. Justice Stewart saw a substantial "free ex-
ercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire
to have their children's school day open with the reading
of passages from the Bible. '26 Thus Stewart's claim for the
Free Exercise Clause is broader than that put forth by
Brennan's first permissible area of accommodation which
seems to be a permissible area only when government has
"cut off"2 those desiring to worship from the normal civil-
ian opportunities to do so. Moreover, it is Stewart's posi-
tion that was rebuked by Clark's words cited above.
Justice Goldberg, speaking also for Justice Harlan, saw
chaplains as allowable under "present and past cases"2
and displayed a readiness to find constitutional accommo-
dations to religion, 29 but not in the context of the Schempp
case.
Justice Douglas concurred in the Schempp decision but
again argued that the use of public funds to promote a
religious exercise was the crux of the constitutional evil.
His opinion, though short, is the only one of those pre-
sented in Schempp that does not in some way refer to the
military chaplaincy, but the tone of his remarks displays
hostility to that practice.
2 374 U.S. at 225-26.
21 374 U.S. at 300.
2' 374 U.S. at 312.
2' 374 U.S. at 299.
28 374 U.S. at 306.
29 374 U.S. at 307.
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In light of Justice Brennan's thesis and the remarks of
the other Justices, it is appropriate to pose several ques-
tions, which are perhaps crucial in determining the con-
stitutionality of the military chaplaincy. 0 First, how far
is Brennan's thesis supported by prior Court pronounce-
ments, recognizing that his thesis assumes that the public
school cases would not be controlling? Second, how does
this thesis square with the major non-judicial writings and
promptings in this area? Third, what is the actual position
of the chaplaincy in the scheme of things military?
II. THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY
Before turning to the Court decisions and the extra-
judicial writings, we pause to consider the history and role
of the military chaplain.
At the outset it should be noted that chaplains are a
tradition in the American military extending back to Rev-
olutionary days. This is in contrast to the less lengthy his-
tory of some of the practices present in public schools which
have been put to constitutional challenge." Indeed, chap-
lains were not unknown to the units the American colonists
supplied in the pre-Revolutionary French and Indian War.3"
The Revolutionary militia units were commonly aug-
mented by a chaplain, often the town clergymen from the
area supplying the troops, but always of the faith of the
majority of the troops he served."3
By 1838 Congress had enacted legislation providing for
chaplains at many regular Army posts.3 4 For some time
thereafter the role of chaplain was a "political plum '3 5
handed out to a local civilian who retained his civilian
status and occupation which did not necessarily include
ministerial duties. However, at the onset of the Civil
War, Congress provided for regimental chaplains who were
80 The issue has not been handled on its merits by any court of law, since
the legal obligation of standing to sue has thwarted attack on the military
chaplaincy. Elliott v. White, 23 F. 2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928).
81 The Regents' Prayer, of course, was of recent vintage. Although Bible
reading or more properly the teaching of reading through use of the Bible
has roots in the Puritan school, the recently-condemned ritual is traceable
to the Protestant influence on education after the Civil War. See BOLES,
THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIc SCHOOLS, ch. 1 (1961). Release-time
programs developed at the turn of the century. McOollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 222-25 (1948).
32 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION AND WELFARE IN THE ARMED
FORCES, THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY 5 (1950) [hereinafter cited as PR si-
DENT'S COMMIrEE].
"Ibid. Only two Roman Catholics served as chaplains in the Revolun-
tionary Army, and no Jew served.
"' Ibid.
"5PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, op. Cit. supra note 32, at 6.
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required to be "regularly ordained ministers of some
Christian denomination."36 While chaplains remained a
part of the uniformed services thereafter, their numbers
were small, only 74 Regular Army Chaplains being on duty
at the time of the entry of the United States into World
War 1.37 The numbers, of course, rose with the expansion
of the military to war-time strength and fell upon return
to "normalcy".
A chapel building program was begun in 1925 and reg-
ular chapels replaced the search for proper areas to hold
services which had resulted in a procuring of facilities on
a catch-as-catch-can basis."'
World War II saw the ranks of Army chaplains swell
above the eight thousand figure, and called nearly three
thousand clergymen to Navy service.3 9
Provision for chaplains of minority faiths has been a
problem to the services.40 This problem is perhaps best
illustrated by noting that the Navy did not commission its
first Roman Catholic chaplain until 1883, and its first Jewish
chaplain until 1917.I Today, the inability to provide a
chaplain even of every major faith at all posts or installa-
tions leads to the provision for the procurement of "auxil-
iary chaplains" on a fee basis where adequate coverage by
active duty chaplains is not available.42
Seeing to the availability of services for communicants
of minority faiths is but one of the tasks of the military
chaplain. His primary task, of course, is administering to
the spiritual needs of the service man in a manner not
30 Ibid.
8 'PRESIDENT'S COMMITrI, op. cit. supra note 32, at 7.
81 Id. at 8.
80 Id. at 8-9.
'OId. at 4.
1 Id. at 9. The problem can also be illustrated by the story of how the
first Jewish chaplain came into the service. At the outbreak of the Civil
War a young Hebrew teacher joined the 65th Regiment of the 5th Pennsyl-
vania Calvary as its elected chaplain. The Commanding Officer of this unit
and many of the officers were Jewish. This chaplain was forced to resign
after serving four months on the ground he was neither an ordained clergy-
man nor a Christian. This episode was magnified and finally President
Lincoln proposed legislation which abolished the former requirement that
a chaplain be Christian, and a rabbi received a commission under the new
legislation in September, 1862. For a detailed account of this episode see
BARISH (ed.), RABBIS IN UNIFoM 3-4 (1962).
42 Army Reg. 165-35, "Religious Activities - Employment of Auxiliary
Chaplains" (1956). This regulation establishes the fees for such auxiliary
chaplains as $18.75 for 'Sundays or Sabbath, major religious holidays or
weekday services in lieu of Sunday or Sabbath; $12.50 for each additional
weekday; and $6.25 for emergency ministrations.
1964]
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unlike the civilian clergyman.43 This clerical role is pro-
tected by regulations which provide that a chaplain "will
not" be assigned duties "unrelated" to their role as clergy-
men "except on a temporary basis in cases of military
emergency."'44 Religious proficiency of the military chap-
lain is insured by requiring him to be duly ordained, li-
censed or certified as a clergyman by a "recognized civilian
ecclesiastical agency".
45
In ministering to the spiritual needs of the serviceman,
the Protestant chaplain is placed in a position unlike his
Jewish or Roman Catholic brethren. He is expected to con-
duct a general, rather than a denominational, Protestant
service to, in effect, provide for a wider denominational
coverage than would be possible if he merely performed a
service in denominational manner.46  However, Federal
statute instructs all chaplains to:
".... when practicable, hold appropriate religious serv-
ices at least once on each Sunday for the command to
which he is assigned, and ... perform appropriate re-
ligious burial services for members of the Army who
die while in that command. ' 47
To free military personnel to attend religious services,
Sunday is a day of reduced duty and labor to the point of
"strict necessity" and athletic and recreational activities on
Sunday are scheduled to present no conflict to worship. 8
Sabbatarians are given consideration also in regard to
excuse from military duties to worship.4 9
,3 Army Reg. 165-15, "Religious Activities - Duties of Chaplains and Com-
manders' Responsibilities," p. 3 (1960); PRESIDENT'S COMMITM, Op. Cit.
supra note 32, at 11, 13; Army Pamphlet 608-2, "The Army Personal Affairs
Handbook," p. 21 (1961).
"Army Reg. 165-15, op. cit. 8upra note 43, at 7-8:
"Commanders will not detail or assign chaplains to duties unrelated
to their duties as clergymen except on a temporary basis in cases of
military emergency. Oommanders will not-
(1) Detail chaplains as exchange, athletic, recreation, graves
registration, welfare, morale, mess, personal affairs, information,
education or special services officers.
(2) Assign chaplains for trial counsel of a court-martial, investi-
gating officer, defense counsel, law officer or as a member of the
court."
'5 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, OP. Cit. supra note 32, at 3. For the Army, the
Secretary of the Army establishes denominational quotas, Army Reg. 165-15,
op. cit. supra note 42, at 2.
"8-PRESIDENT'S CoMMITTEF, op. cit. 8upra note 32, at 11, 12; Army Reg.
165-15, op. cit. 8upra note 43, at 3.
17 10 U.S.C. § 3547 (1959).




Ecclesiastical rules are further respected to the extent
of specifically freeing a chaplain from performing joint
services of several denominations where their denomina-
tional or ecclesiastical tenets prohibit such services, and
from performing marriage or other religious ceremonies
between or for military personnel who have not complied
with denominational requirements of the chaplain's
church.50
In addition to his status as clergyman, the chaplain is
also considered a staff officer 1 and in this role, as well as
in a dual role of both clergyman and staff officer, certain
duties and responsibilities fall to the chaplain. Throughout
the military, the chaplain is looked upon as a counselor or
personal advisor to the troops.5 2 In this role he provides a
ready ear for a wide variety of problems that plague the
serviceman,53 from debts to unfair treatment, from marital
difficulties to homeless families.54
To protect this role as a man to whom troubles can be
told, words spoken to a chaplain as clergyman or confidant
are protected as privileged communications. 5 By this role,
the chaplain becomes a channel for presentation of griev-
ances to the commander," and a source of information on
the morale of a command.
Purely as a staff officer, the chaplain becomes a coordi-
nator of religious programs, the fund estimator for such
programs, the advisor to the commander on religious,
moral, and morale matters, and liaison with local clergy-
men in the same matters.57
50 Army Reg. 165-15, op. cit. supra note 43, at 3.
51 Id. at 1. A chaplain is always addressed as "Chaplain" regardless of
rank. Ibid.
5 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTE:E Op. cit. supra note 32, at 12.
53 Army Pamphlet 20-145, "Troop Topics," pp. 12-13 (1962):
"Sometimes a soldier will be troubled by a religious or spiritual
matter. Or perhaps he has a personal problem that he doesn't feel
like discussing with his officers or noncoms. * * * Perhaps he just feels
like talking to someone to 'get it off his chest.'
"The best advice you can give such a soldier is to see his chaplain
and talk over the difficulties. Chaplains often help soldiers with
problems that no other person or agency in the Army can solve. And
the soldier can be sure that his problem will be treated in the same
confidential manner by his chaplain as they would, be by his own
minister, priest or rabbi."
51 Army Pamphlet 608-2, op. cit. supra note 43, at 22.
55 United States v. Kidd, 20 C.M.R. 713, 718-19 (1955) ; Army Reg. 165-15,
op. Cit. supra note 43, at 2.
"
8 PReSrENT's COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 18.
57 Army Reg. 165-15, op. cit. supra note 43, at 5.
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In the Army and Air Force the chaplain has responsi-
bility for the character guidance program within a com-
mand.58 This program is designed to promote:
"... healthy mental, moral and social attitudes in the
personnel.... By this program the Army endeavors
to maintain the wholesome influences of family, com-
munity and cultural heritage. . .. Generally, the
Character Guidance Program is designed to encourage
high standards of personal conduct among members
of the Army. It aims to strengthen in the individual
those basic moral, spiritual and historical truths which
motivate the patriot and undergird the Code of Con-
duct."5 9
At Departmental level, the Chief of Chaplains develops
policy for the program and prepares instructional material
to support it.60
In reviewing the history, role and duties of the military
chaplain a closing note must emphasize that, while wor-
ship opportunity is provided on a wide scale,6' attendance
at worship services is on a voluntary basis.62 This voluntary
aspect is significant for it negates the vision of marching
the troops in formation to religious services. Compulsory
worship is foreign to the chaplaincy program which can be
seen as a far-reaching effort to provide worship opportunity
for the service man.63 The opportunity is financed by the
Federal government. Chapels are built with Federal funds
and chaplains receive the compensation which goes with
their commissions.
From the review of the chaplaincy presented there can
be little doubt that this scheme causes involvement of the
Federal Government with religion and religious observ-
ance. In short, the closed society of men at arms is pro-
vided its religious opportunity from within its own ranks
by members brought into the society who have certain re-
ligious credentials. And the purpose of this scheme is to
enhance the morale and welfare of the serviceman and
make effective his desire for religious worship.64 However,
58 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE, Op. cit. 8upra note 32, at 13.
59 Army Reg. 600-30, "Personnel - General - Character Guidance Pro
gram," p. 1 (1959).
60 Id. at 4.
61 -PREsIDEmT's CoMMrTTE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 19.
02 Army Reg. 165-15, op. cit. supra note 43, at 7.
5 See DRINAN, REmmioN, THE COURTS, AND PuiC Poucy 24-26 (1963).
8 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTE, op. cit. supra note 32, at 1-3.
386
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there can also be little doubt that the scheme serves also,
purposefully or not, to assist the church to retain its
communicants.
III. PRIOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DECISIONS AND How
THEY SQUARE WITH BRENNAN's THEsIs
The interpretation offered by Justice Brennan in effect
would withhold a strict application of the Establishment
Clause when individuals, under some governmentally im-
posed disability, would be seriously hampered in their
right to free exercise. A review of the prior judicial pro-
nouncements of the Court in the establishment area is in
order to discover whether Brennan's thesis has any prior
judicial support. One must, however, recognize that Bren-
nan's thesis was specifically designed to meet future prob-
lems that might be presented, rather than as an attempt to
delineate a policy from prior pronouncement.
It is readily recognized that Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation 5 was the first decision of the Court to clearly come
to grips with the Establishment Clause.66 The opinion of
the Court's majority, written by Justice Black, has been a
source of varying interpretation 67 since its pronouncement
due to the paradox of the opinion; on the one hand, it used
absolute language to define the Establishment Clause as
prohibiting aid to religion, while, on the other hand, it gave
constitutional approval to a New Jersey statute" which
65 330 U.S. 1 (1947).60 Id. at 29 (Justice Rutledge, dissenting) ; KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW 80 (1962).
67 Compare U.S. Dep't of H.E.W., Memorandum on the Impact of the
First Amendment to the Constitution Upon Federal Aid to Education, 50
GEO. L.J. 349, 360-63 (1961) with Legal Department, National Catholic
Welfare Conference, The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-
Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education, 50 Go. L.J. 397, 418-19 (1961).
08 Since a state statute was drawn in question, and the First Amendment
applies by Its terms only to Congressional action, some vehicle was needed
to make the provisions of the First Amendment applicable to the states.
That vehicle was found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this instance the non-establishment provisions of the First
Amendment were made applicable to the states and another chapter was
added to the First Amendment carryover which began in Gitlow v. New
York, 269 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
In Everson the Court did not explain how the non-establishment clause
came to apply to the states but merely said that it did. Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). This dearth of explanation has never
been remedied and there are several examples of the Justices groping for
an explanation or pondering an explanation. The most recent example is
provided by Justice Stewart who at a loss for an explanation, noted' his
acceptance of "the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment has some-
how absorbed the Establishment Clause...." Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963). Another example was provided from
the Bench during the argument of the Sunday Closing Law cases. During
19641
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allowed reimbursement to parents of funds expended in
providing bus transportation for their children to parochial
schools.
Justice Black's opinion, in so far as it establishes an
absolute doctrine prohibiting any aid to one religion or all
argument, Justice Frankfurter challenged counsel's assertion that the
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the First Amendment's proscription
against the establishment of religion. In aid of harried counsel, Justice
Douglas asserted: "I think 'the members of this Court could furnish
[examples supporting counsel's position]." In reply, Justice Frankfurter
said: "I do not think you will find any cases in which a majority of this
Court said the specific proscriptions of the First Amendment were made
applicable to the states." Not silenced, Justice Douglas asserted: "I can
give you a good list of them." 29 U.'S.L. WE 3175 (Dec. 13, 1960).
Arguments against applying the non-establishment clause to the states
assert that the Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state invasion of
"liberty", and, whereas the "free exercise" of religion is clearly a liberty
which is properly protected against state action, an "establishment of
religion" is not necessarily a deprivation of liberty, but primarily a regu-
lation of governmental relations. Drinker, Some Observations on the Four
Freedoms of the First Amendment, 37 B.U.L. REv. 1, 55, 67. (1957). Further-
more, the argument goes, the Bill of Rights has a federalism aspect which
in the case of the non-establishment provision meant to leave the aspect
of church-state relations to the states while prohibiting Federal intrusion,
and the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment in no way raised as high a
barrier against state governments as must be recognized against the Federal
government. Howe, The Constitutional Question, in Fund for the Republic
(ed.), RELGIoN AND TnE FREE SoCIETY 51, 55-56, 61 (1958) ; Snee, Religious
Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CATHoLiO LAw. 301,
308, 317 (1955). The most candid exploration of this problem of applying
the non-establishment provisions against the states is found in Corwin,
The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
3, 14 (1949).
As a matter of history there is some evidence which specifically points to
the incorrectness of the application of the non-establishment clause to the
states. Not only were there established churches in the states at the time
of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, GREENE, RELGIoN AND THE STATE
82-93 (1941; paperback, 1959), but, as well, the attempt to enact the
"Blaine Amendment" indicates that Senators did not believe the Four-
teenth Amendment would have the effect that judicial interpretation has
given it. See Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64
HAnv. L. REv. 939, 942 (1951).
Also, Justices Holmes and Brandeis seemed to accept a less rigorous
application of First Amendment rights when applied against the States
through the "libery" of the Fourteenth Amendment than they would when
Congressional action was drawn in question. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 672 (1925).
It is also interesting to note that an eminent law professor writing at
the time of Gitlow foresaw the expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and even predicted the eventual application of the Free
Exercise Clause against the states, but made no reference to the non-
establishment provision as of conceivable application to the states. Warren,
The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARY. L. REV.
431, 458 (1926).
Thus it hardly seems inevitable that the non-establishment provisions
would be applied to the states. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 58 (1961).
Yet the Court has reaffirmed often the principle that the non-establish-
ment clause is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
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religions, 69 gives little succor to the Brennan thesis. Surely,
an absolute prohibition of aid to religion would not allow
for the flexibility Brennan would accept. A doctrine which
included a prohibition against a tax to support "any relig-
ious activities and institutions" would presumably negate
the governmental payment of salaries to chaplains and the
construction of chapels from public funds, even if other-
wise men in military service would lose the opportunity to
worship.
However, Justice Black did not merely declare a doc-
trine in Everson; he construed a statute to avoid the effect
of that doctrine. The basis for this construction apparently
was a desire to insure that the courts:
".... [did] not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general State law benefits to all its citi-
zens without regard to their religious belief.""0
In essence, he refused to force the state to cut off aid to
anyone "because of their faith or lack of it."'" This opinion
then rejects classification on the basis of religion as consti-
tutionally permissible under the First Amendment. 2
Yet, this holding, relying as it does on the general nature
of the law before the Court, does not presage the Brennan
thesis which essentially allows a non-general or special
exception or classification in order to provide those wishing
to worship the opportunity to do so. Expenditures for
chaplains who perform a primarily religious mission is
hardly classification not on the basis of religion.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson, also stressed the
absoluteness of the prohibition he saw in the First Amend-
ment, 3 but his opinion stressed that children were in-
69 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) :
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all re-
ligions or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor in-
fluence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a State nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups or vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and State'."
7O1d. at 16. (Emphasis added.)71 Ibid.
2 The opinion provides ammunition for the thesis propounded by KUR-
LAND, op. cit. supra note 66, at 82.
". Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947).
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volved, that the only school children assisted were those of
Catholic parents,74 and that the Roman Catholic Church
relied on "indelible indoctrination in the faith and order
of the Church ' 75 by its schools to make its young into good
Catholic adults. The stress on these factors, not present in
the military chaplain situation, are distinguishing factors,
as Brennan noted when he put aside the school cases.
If some support, even if only growing out of a basis for
distinction, can be drawn for Brennan's thesis from Justice
Jackson's dissent, there is no support flowing from Justice
Rutledge's dissent,76 which vigorously espouses an absolute
separation of Church and State, fearing even the slightest
breach in the wall of separation. 77 That the protection ac-
corded by the Free Exercise Clause would have any in-
fluence on an Establishment Clause case was apparently
not contemplated by Rutledge, for he wrote:
"Our constitutional policy . ..does not deny the
value or the necessity for religious training, teaching
or observance .... But to that end it does deny that
the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or
degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity,
as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties,
has been given the two-fold protection and, as the state
cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in per-
forming the religious function. The dual prohibition
makes that function altogether private."7 "
The Everson opinions were followed in a few years by
McCollum v. Board of Education 9 and Zorach v. Clauson.0
In McCollum the Court, by 8 to 1 vote, held unconstitu-
tional a plan whereby representatives of the various reli-
gious faiths were allowed to enter public school buildings to
conduct weekly religious classes to which children, with
parental consent, were sent and their attendance checked,
while those children not wishing religious instruction were
sent off to pursue their secular studies. Justice Black, in a
4 KURLAND, Op. Cit. supra note 66, at 83, indicates this interpretation,
not any conflict in dioctrinal attitude, is reason for Justice Jackson's
split with Justice Black.
71 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 23 (1947).
76 Justice. Rutledge's opinion has gained stature due to the citation of
it by the Court in Schempp. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 217-19 (1963).
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) ; KuwrA&D, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 84.
78 Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 77, at 52. (Emphasis added.)
79 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
80343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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relatively short opinion, seemed to stress that the close
cooperation between Church and State to promote religious
ends was the constitutional evil.
"The... facts ... show the use of tax-supported prop-
erty for religious instruction and the close coopera-
tion between the school authorities and the religious
council in promoting religious education. The opera-
tion of the State's compulsory education system thus
assists and is integrated with the program of religious
instruction carried on by separate religious sects.
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular
education are released in part from their legal duty
upon condition that they attend the religious classes.
This is beyond all question a utilization of a tax-
established and tax-supported public school system to
aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment. ... "
After refusing to turn away from the doctrine of separation
of Church and State as defined by Everson and rejecting
any nullification of the holding there that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause applicable to the states,82 Justice Black closed his
opinion for the Court by stressing the "invaluable aid"
sectarian groups acquired when the compulsory public
school system was the vehicle for their religious classes.8 1
Black's opinion in McCollum, especially his denunci-
ation of the use of tax supported school-systems to aid reli-
gion indicates the need for Brennan's thesis for those favor-
ing preservation of the military chaplaincy. Brennan's
thesis can, of course, gain no vitality from McCollum for it,
in essence, stands for a proposition found abhorrent there.
Brennan, in effect, says there are times when close coopera-
tion between church and state and the use of taxes to assist
religion and aid in promoting sectarian doctrine are not
constitutionally dispositive.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in the de-
cision in McCollum but presented their own opinions.
Frankfurter opened by stressing that the separation doc-
trine was not ultimately definitive and would require a case
by case analysis to determine "what the wall separates. '84
Frankfurter then delivered a history of public education
Si McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948).
s' Id. at 211. The Court also denied it was being hostile to religion by
its decision.
88 333 U.S. at 212.
81333 U.S. at 213.
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showing the influence of religion upon it, and the desire
of Americans to prohibit the comingling of secular and
sectarian instruction in public schools. The "inherent pres-
sure"8 5 upon the child by the public school system to attend
religious instruction, and the inculcation in any dissenter
of a "feeling of separatism" were:
". .. precisely the consequences against which the Con-
stitution was directed when it prohibited the Govern-
ment common to all from becoming embroiled, how-
ever innocently, in . . . destructive religious conflicts.
86
" .. [Furthermore] the public school is at once the
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of
the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say
fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly
apart.))87
This emphasis on the character of the public school and
its place in society at least serves to point out that Bren-
nan's basis for distinguishing88 these cases is readily dis-
coverable.
Concurring in McCollum, Justice Jackson wrote can-
didly in criticizing what he believed was the Court's ac-
ceptance of the "role of a super board of education for
every school district in the nation"' 9 when he pointed out
that in the matter of determining when the secular ends
and the sectarian begins the Court "can find no law but
[its] own prepossessions."9 °
If Frankfurter stressed the psychological impact of the
plan before the Court, and Jackson urged caution in pro-
ceeding in this area of church and state relations, Justice
Reed also added an important element to McCollum by
being the first Justice to stray from the absolute separation
principle. He directed attention to the many accommoda-
tions between Church and State in America, including the
85 333 U.S. at 227. Cf. Griswold, Absolute Is In the Dark - A Discussion
of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH
L. Rsv. 167, 177 (1963), which, in effect, argues that a non-conforming child
can learn about his differences in as painless a way possible in the public
schools.
86 McCollum v. 'Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 228 (1948).
87 Id. at 231.8 8 Abington School Dist. v. 'Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294, 298-99 (1963).
80 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203,237 (1948).
90Id. at 238.
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military and Academy chaplains, and rejected history as
an accurate guide for an absolute approach in this area.
Showing "great respect""' for the traditions and customs
of the American people, Justice Reed concluded:
"Whatever may be the wisdom of the arrangement
* . .it is clear . . . that past practice shows such co-
operation... is not forbidden by the First Amendment.
. . . .The prohibition of enactments respecting the
establishment of religion do not bar every friendly
gesture between church and state. It is not an absolute
prohibition against every conceivable situation where
the two may work together, any more than the other
provisions of the First Amendment - free speech and
free press - are absolutes. If abuses occur... I have
no doubt . .. that [the state] will promptly correct
them .... This Court cannot be too cautious in up-
setting practices embedded in our society by many
years of experience .... Devotion to the great prin-
ciple of religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid
interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that con-
flicts with accepted habits of our people."'92
Reed, dismissing the fear that one step toward accommo-
dation necessarily leads to an unacceptable form of estab-
lishment, thus rejected the absolutist approach. He also
showed a tendency to respect, as constitutionally valid,
practices which though aiding religion, had become tra-
ditional objects of state support. Unfortunately for one
seeking to find support for Brennan's thesis, Reed spoke
in dissent.
However, Reed's dissent was vindicated a mere four
years later in Zorach. Justice Douglas, speaking for a six-
member majority, distinguished away93 McCollum, and
held that a "release time plan" was constitutional when the
public school allowed children desiring religious instruc-
tion to be excused from attendance at the public school so
that they could leave the school area and proceed to reli-
gious centers for religious instruction or devotion. Yet the
scope of that decision has been limited to citation for the
obvious, i.e., "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being."94 Moreover, the author of
that opinion, now is an ardent foe of "accommodation",
11 O'BmIEN, JuSTIcE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 148 (1958).
"AfcCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 255-56. (Emphasis
added.)
93 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1952).
14 Id. at 313.
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especially if it means the use of salaried officials in any
way.95 Nevertheless, Zorach did allow an accommodation
of religious practices.
In filing separate dissents to Zorach, Justices Black,
Frankfurter and Jackson each stressed McCollum and their
inability to see a constitutional distinction between that
case and the case before them,96 as well as stressing the
nature of the public school system and the inherent com-
pulsion to young students involved in this plan.97 If, as
Justice Jackson feared, the Court started "down a rough
road when we mix compulsory public education with com-
pulsory godliness," 98 it established its own stop sign and
detour by denouncing as unconstitutional the Regent
Prayer and Bible Reading in the public school. Perhaps,
this own brake of the Court is evidence enough that the
"one step means all is lost" approach fears a bogey man.
Everson, McCollum and Zorach, the early battleground
of the Establishment Clause, were all cases related to state
aids to religion in which education was the focal point of
the accommodation attacked. These cases remained the
sum total of the discourse in the Establishment area until
1961, when the Court decided the Blue Law cases,9  which
were an intervening step between the early school related
cases and Engle and Schempp. In fact, the Blue Law de-
cisions are the only non-education related decisions pre-
cisely decided upon the Establishment Clause.10 Signifi-
cantly for Brennan's thesis that the school-related cases
and their doctrine of complete separation must be confined
to that area of accommodation, the Blue Laws were found
constitutionally permissible.
Unlike leopards which reputedly do not change their
spots, the Sunday Laws were found to have outgrown their
original religious basis and were justified, against challenge
on an Establishment basis, as a public welfare measure
which set one day apart as a "day of rest, repose, recreation
and tranquility.'' 101 The challenge to the Sunday Laws on
95 Justice Douglas' current reliance upon the fact that the actor involved
in the religious exercise was on the public payroll to decide the recent cases
may be an attempt to reject the practices before the Court while main-
taining the validity of his opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
90 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319, 322-23, 325.
9 Id. at 318, 321, 324.
08343 U.S. at 325.
91 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; Two Guys v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961) ; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) ; Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
100 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), on its face, does not refer to
the Establishment Clause, although that seems to underpin its rationale.1 1 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961).
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Establishment grounds was refuted by an 8-1 vote. In
presenting his opinion denying the Establishment claim,
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for himself and five Jus-
tices, related the evolution of Sunday laws and then pro-
ceeded to a consideration of the "standards" against which
the statutes would be evaluated.
"[T]he 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or
state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions. In many instances, the
Congress or state legislatures conclude that the gen-
eral welfare of society, wholly apart from any religious
considerations, demands such regulation. Thus, for
temporal purposes, murder is illegal. And the fact that
this agrees with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian
religions while it may disagree with others does not
invalidate the regulation....
"In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing
Laws through the centuries, and of their more or less
recent emphasis upon secular considerations, it is not
difficult to discern that as presently written and ad-
ministered, most of them, at least, are of a secular
rather than of a religious character, and that presently
they bear no relationship to establishment of religion.
",102
Thus, from the Warren opinion, comes an approach
which allows for accommodation of Church and State when
religious motives are sublimated and secular motive can
justify the state action. In effect, the religious motivations
for the Sunday Laws were read out of the case. It is to be
noted, however, that there must be basis for the enact-
ment "wholly apart from any religious considerations."
This separate secular motivation is not easily assumed,
since the Court apparently rejected, in Schempp,'0 3 the ar-
gument for school opening exercises on the basis of calming
the children at the outset of the school day so that they
could leave the raucousness of the playground and accept
the contemplation of school work.
While this aspect of the Warren opinion does not negate
out of hand the absolutist pose of McCollum and, to a lesser
extent because of its holding, Everson, it does show a way
102 Id. at 442-44. (Emphasis added.)
10' See the remarks of Justice Brennan, Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 280-81 (1963).
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around the absolute prohibition - by reading the religious
character of the accommodation out of the case. However,
there seems to be no semantic gymnastics 04 that can dis-
solve the religious character of the military chaplaincy.
The reasons for providing chaplains may include enhanc-
ing morale and maintaining continuity with civilian life.0 5
But the services of the chaplain, if they are to enhance
morale, etc., are essentially religious in their nature, pur-
pose and effect.
Two other aspects of the Warren opinion are note-
worthy. First, while establishing the standards to guide
the Court, Warren, adding emphasis, footnoted a comment
made by Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson, in which
the former Law School Dean noted that the "only serious
surviving threat" to the separation of Church and State
demanded by the First Amendment, aside from efforts to
inject sectarian exercises into public schools, came "through
the use of taxing power to support religion."'1 6 It is con-
ceivable that both author and quoter had in mind the use
of tax funds to support military chaplains. Second, in dis-
tinguishing McCollum, Warren noted the lack of "direct"
cooperation between Church and State and the broader
scope of alternatives opened to those facing Blue Law pros-
ecution. Thus, the degree of Church-State integration and
the alternative means of accomplishing the state's objective
or avoiding the state's prosecution were specifically made
constitutionally relevant in a non-school case.
In concurring in rejecting the Establishment claim by
those prosecuted under Sunday Closing Laws, Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan excluded the absolutist approach
and sought to define a weighing or balancing approach
deemed relevant in Establishment Clause cases.0 7 In this
area stress also was placed on the "primary end"'08 of the
statute drawn into question and the "alternative means" ''
of accomplishing the desired end. Amplifying this ap-
proach, Frankfurter and Harlan wrote:
"The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to
assure that the national legislature would not exert
1o Cf. Justice Frankfurter's comment about "verbal cellophane", dissent-
ing in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953).
105 PRESIDENT'S Co[mmIEE ON RELIGION AND WELFARE IN THE ARMED
FORCES, THE MILITARY CHAPLAINS 1-3 (1950).
108 McGowan v. "Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, at 444, n. 18 (1961), quoting
Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everon.
107 Id. at 462.
100 366 U.S. at 466.
100 366 U.S. at 462.
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its power in the service of any purely religious end.
' 110
"With regulations which have other objectives, the
Establishment Clause, and the fundamental separa-
tionist concept which it expresses, are not concerned.
.... [O]nce it is determined that a challenged statute
is supportable as implementing other substantial in-
terest than the promotion of belief, the guarantee pro-
hibiting religious establishment is satisfied.
"To ask what interest, what objective, legislation
serves . . . is not to psycholanalyze its legislators, but
to examine the necessary effects of what they have
enacted. If the primary end achieved by a form of
regulation is the affirmation or promotion of religious
doctrine - primary, in the sense that all secular ends
which it purportedly serves are derivative from, not
wholly independent of, the advancement of religion
- the regulation is beyond the power of the state.
This was the case in McCollum. Or if a statute fur-
thers both secular and religious ends by means un-
necessary to the effectuation of the secular end alone
- where the secular end could equally be attained by
means which do not have consequences for the pro-
motion of religion - the statute cannot stand. A
State may not endow a church although that church
might inculcate in its parishoners moral concepts
deemed to make them better citizens, because of the
very raison d'etre of a church . . . is the predication
of a religious doctrine."111
Several comments may be made concerning this posi-
tion. First, unlike Warren, Frankfurter and Harlan be-
lieved that the religious motive need not be completely read
out of the motivation for the statue. But where there are
religious motives, there must be a secular end which can be
perpetuated only by means which give succor to both the
sectarian and secular objectives. Second, the comment dis-
claiming any endowments to a church is high velocity
ammunition for those claiming the military chaplaincy
breaches constitutional principle. Also it is to be noted that
the Brennan, unlike the Frankfurter, approach in Schempp
exalts the end or object of the legislation which is seen as
the promotion of free exercise.
110 366 U.S. at 465. (Emphasis added.)
111366 U.S. at 466-67. (Emphasis added.)
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The lone dissenter on the Establishment aspect of the
Sunday Closing Law cases was Justice Douglas who re-
fused to believe that a statute, religiously-motivated in
conception, could alter its basis through historical develop-
ment."2 Rejecting the balancing approach," 3 the Justice
said:
". if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs
of our people, it is to be done by individuals and groups,
not by the government." 114
In two"5 of the four Sunday Closing Law cases, the
Court went beyond the Establishment issue and reached a
challenge to the statutes on free exercise grounds put forth
by Orthodox Jews, who claimed that, since they closed for
religious purposes on Saturday and were required to close
by law on Sunday, their religious observance caused an
economic penalty not forced upon the Christian majority
who closed on only one day a week, their Sabbath. There
was no majority opinion denying this contention, but, since
Chief Justice Warren had three Justices join in his opinion
and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the de-
cision on separate grounds, the statutes withstood the Free
Exercise challenge. Significantly, in light of his thesis in
Schempp, Justice Brennan dissented on this point and filed
an opinion which demonstrated his willingness to give the
widest scope possible to the free exercise of religion.
In dissenting, Justice Brennan wrote:
".... The values of the First Amendment, as embodied
in the Fourteenth, look primarily towards the preser-
vation of personal liberty, rather than towards the ful-
fillment of collective goals.""16
From this position, the Justice posed the question, "whether
a State may put an individual to a choice between his bus-
iness and his religion.""' 7 In answering this question, Bren-
nan looked at Justice Jackson's words in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette"58 for an applicable
standard, which allowed restriction on the freedom of wor-
11 366 U.S. at 572-73.
213 366 U.S. at 575.
I" 366 U.S. at 563.
115 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and, Gallagher v. Crown
Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).1108Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 115, at 610.
1
7 Id. at 611. The question in a chaplaincy case might be put analogously:
May a soldier be put to a choice of serving his nation with no assurance
that his desire for worship will be preserved?
18 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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ship only "to prevent grave and immediate danger to in-
terests which the State may lawfully protect."119 He be-
lieved that the effect of the Sunday Closing Laws was:
".... that no one may at one and the same time be an
Orthodox Jew and compete effectively with his Sun-
day-observing fellow tradesmen."'120
Brennan found no balancing factor to outweight "this state-
imposed burden on Orthodox Judaism, 121 rejecting out of
hand the need for one day set aside for rest as a "mere con-
venience".122
Of Brennan's performance in the Sunday Closing Law
cases, this much can be said: in joining the Chief Justice
in finding no Establishment violation, Brennan accepted
the secular motivation of the statutes and found no Estab-
lishment when religious tenets happened to coincide with
secular motives; in arguing for overturning the statute on
free exercise grounds, he found no counter balancing need
that allowed the State to force the Orthodox Jew to choose
between his religion and effective economic competition.123
In short then, Brennan displayed a propensity to vigorously
apply the Free Exercise Clause to prevent burdens upon
worship, but was willing to look closely at a statute chal-
lenged on Establishment grounds to discover whether the
motives and effects of the enactment were incompatible
with the Constitutional mandate.
Three weeks after the Sunday Closing Law decisions
the Court struck down a Maryland requirement that a
notary public swear to belief in God as a prerequisite to
obtaining his commission. 2 4 Justice Black, writing for the
Court, 125 did not clearly indicate whether he was resting
his opinion on the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause.
However, the effect of the Maryland requirement was to
prefer those willing to express a belief in God 126 and thus
can be said to have created an establishment situation.
Black reiterated the Everson and McCollum principles, and
Zorach was said to give no comfort to the State's position
119 Ibid., quoted in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 611-12 (1961).
120 Braunfeld v. 'Brown, supra note 117, at 613.
121 Ibid.
122 366 U.S. at 614.
123 A different view was taken by the Chief Justice who believed that to
allow Orthodox Jews to remain open on Sunday might give them an
economic advantage. 366 U.S. at 608-09.
124 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 438 (1961).
125 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan merely concurred in the result.
12 0Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961).
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here. The element of non-compulsion to hold public office
was brushed aside as constitutionally irrelevant.
From this review of the Court's decisions and reasoning
in cases decided upon Establishment grounds, Brennan's
thesis finds little solid support. The most that can be
claimed by supporters of his thesis is that there exists in
the school cases adequate factual grounds for distinguish-
ing the chaplain's situation and that the Sunday Closing
Law cases announced a standard of adjudication not wholly
at odds with support of the chaplaincy. By providing al-
ternative means of accomplishing a desirable and consti-
tutional end, the Court allows supporters of the chaplaincy
to argue that the justifiable end is promoting the free exer-
cise of religion and that there are no practical alternative
means of accomplishing this end in the military situation
which takes men to far corners of the world where oppor-
tunities are unavailable for continued worship in a manner
normal to American civilians.
IV. FREE EXERCISE CASES: SUPPORT FOR SUBSMY
To RELIGION?
While the Establishment cases are generally of little
advantage to one favoring Brennan's thesis and supporting
military chaplains, there are two or three decisions'27 on
Free Exercise grounds in which the dissenters claimed that
a subsidy to religion was sanctioned by the majority.
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania12 the Court, per Justice
Douglas, held a city ordinance requiring the purchase by
itinerant solicitors of a license prior to soliciting orders for
merchandise of any kind unconstitutional as applied to a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect who went from
door to door soliciting the purchase of, and distributing,
religious literature. The religious colporteurs involved
were found to be doing more than merely distributing re-
ligious literature or preaching. Their activity was:
"... a combination of both. . . . This form of reli-
gious activity occupies the same high estate under the
127 Cf. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 57-74 (1962). The Professor
seeks to include Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), as a case in which
religious proselyting may have been the reason for the nullification of a
conviction for using a sound truck without ,the license required by state
law. The Professor points to Kovacs v. Oooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), where
a contrary result was rendered and indicates that the difference in decision
may have resulted from the fact that in Kovacs no religious proselytizing
was involved. KURLAND, op. cit. supra, at 72. Yet it must be noted that Saia
speaks only in regard to freedom of speech and makes no mention of
standing on the religious nature of the words spoken.
128 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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First Amendment as do worship in the churches and
preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to
protection as the more orthodox and conventional
exercises of religion.' 1 29
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that to allow the
Jehovah's Witnesses here to be absolved from the license
tax was, in effect, giving them, a religious sect, a subsidy
and thus offended the "separation of church and state."1 '
Apparently in reply to this dissent Justice Douglas
wrote:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the
press are free from all financial burdens of govern-
ment. . . . It is one thing to impose a tax on the
income or property of a preacher. It is quite another
thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of
delivering a sermon."' 31
Once the majority's premise that the activity of the
defendant was a religious exercise is accepted, it is difficult
to fault the opinion on the grounds put forth by Justice
Frankfurter. A parallel would be appropriate in explana-
tion. If a city placed a tax on the speaking of Latin, could
it be applied to exact revenue from a priest desiring to
celebrate Mass? 132 The answer would appear to be an
obvious no.
A very similar situation was presented to the Court in
Follett v. Town of McCormick,"' which arose out of the
conviction of a pamphlet-selling and distributing Jehovah's
Witness of breaching a township ordinance requiring a li-
cense for the sale of books by persons engaged in that bus-
iness in the town.
Justice Douglas again spoke for the majority in ruling
the statute unconstitutional. "A preacher has no less a
claim ... when he is not itinerant.""13 4 The Court refused
121 Id. at 109.
110 319 U.S. at 140.
11319 U.S. at 112.
132 The question of whether this analogy is valid depends on whether one
would view a tax on the speaking of Latin as unlike a license fee in that
it would have, arguably, a special rather than a general effect. See City of
Baltimore v. A. S. Abell 0o., 218 Md. 273, 145 A. 2d 111, 119 (1958), where
a tax which looked for 90-95% of its intended revenue from television and
radio stations was held unconstitutional although there was no desire to
punish the news media. The effect of burdening freedom of press was
controlling.
133321 U.S. 573 (1944).
Id. at 577.
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to see their action as a subsidy to religion, but merely be-
lieved it the striking down of a statute requiring the pay-
ment of a tax so that one might enjoy his right of free exer-
cise of religion." 5
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson again urged
the general nature of the taxation involved, and that to
absolve one from the payment of the tax on the majority's
grounds was a "subsidy for his religion.' 116 The Justices
said, further:
"We cannot ignore what this decision involves. If the
First Amendment grants immunity from taxation to
the exercise of religion, it must equally grant a similar
exemption to those who speak and to the press....
The Amendment's prohibitions are equally sweep-
ing. 137
The disquieting feature of these words is that there is
no prohibition against an "establishment" of speech and
press. Yet, if the words of three Justices are not merely
the exaggerations of an outvoted triumvirate, and truly
gauge the import of the decisions, there would perhaps be
precedent for a "subsidy" to military chaplains. However,
nowhere in Brennan's lengthy opinion are these cases
mentioned.
Their most recent citation came in Sherbert v. Verner3 8
which is the Court's most recent discussion of the Free
Exercise Clause and a decision which prompted a dissent-
ing Justice,'3 9 like the dissenters in Murdock and Follett,
to imply that the Court was sanctioning a violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Court in Sherbert, through
Justice Brennan, held a South Carolina statute unconsti-
tutional when applied to withhold unemployment benefits
from a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to accept Sat-
urday employment and consequently was labelled as re-
fusing to accept suitable work when offered.
In so holding, Justice Brennan again displayed an
affinity for a broad interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause. 4 ' Writing the same day the Schempp decision was
announced, he found that the disqualification for benefits
imposed a burden on the free exercise of appellant's reli-
135 321 U.S. at 577-78.
116 321 U.S. at 581.
117321 U.S. at 581-82.
135374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
135 Id. at 422.
1C Of. note 120 supra.
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gion."4' The burden arose from "unmistakable"'142 pressure
to forego beliefs. Moreover, there was no "compelling state
interest,"'14s as in the Sunday Closing cases, ' 4 that justified
the infringement of appellant's First Amendment rights of
free exercise.
Although he concurred in the result, Justice Stewart
did take advantage of this decision to chide the majority
on its previous Establishment Clause decisions and argued
that this decision created an establishment inconsistent
with the previous decisions. 145 For Stewart, the Court
would not have granted relief from the effect of the statute
if the appellant refused work on "secular grounds" such as
inability to get a babysitter, and, thus, by protecting the
belief of the Seventh Day Adventist here, required the
State to "prefer a religious ground over a secular ground
for being unavailable for work - that state financial sup-
port of the appellant's religion is constitutionally required.
"146 Stewart would have the Court reconsider its Estab-
lishment Clause position on the basis of the Free Exercise
Clause. He believed:
".. . that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied
in the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires
government to create an atmosphere of hospitality and
accommodation to individual belief or disbelief. In
short, I think our Constitution commands the positive
protection by government of religious freedom - not
only for a minority, however small - not only for the
majority, however large - but for each of us."147
This demand for an affirmative fostering of religious
freedom by government distinguished the views of Jus-
tices Stewart and Brennan in Schempp and again here.
Dissenting, Justices Harlan and White rebuked the
Court for compelling a state to carve out an exception for
those unavailable for work due to their religious scruples.
This dissent was in the tradition of those expressed in
Follett 4 ' and Murdock. However, Justice Harlan, as author
11 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
142 Id. at 404.
... 374 U.S. at 406-09.
144 See note 99 supra.
"4 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-15 (1963).
140 Id. at 416.
1' 374 U.S. at 415-16. (Emphasis added.)
14' The remarks of Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson were not
labelled a dissent by the Justices but were so categorized by the reporter.
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944).
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of the dissent, recognized, as he had concurring in Schempp,
that there were permissible accommodations which a state
might accord religion. Since Justice White agreed with
this dissent, a member of the Court, not writing in
Schempp, tacitly accepted the proposition that there may
be areas of permissible accommodation between Church
and State. Indeed, the dissenters would have found a per-
missible accommodation present if South Carolina had
done legislatively what the Court did by judicial fiat.'49
In answer to the views of Justices Stewart, Harlan and
White, Brennan's opinion for the Court argued that the
decision did not have the effect of "fostering the 'establish-
ment' of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Car-
olina."'"" Rather, a person, on the basis of Everson,5' can-
not, by lack of faith or because of his faith, be deprived of
the benefits of public welfare legislation.9 2 This position
for the majority was nothing more than an elaboration of
one of Brennan's areas of permissible accommodation put
forward in his concurring opinion in Schempp.53 This is,
perhaps, the most significant feature of the Sherbert deci-
sion for one who would seek to support the military chap-
laincy on constitutional grounds. There can be hope that
Brennan's area of accommodation for chaplains will be
accepted in future litigation of that issue, since the Court
has accepted another area of accommodation put forth by
Brennan. One speculating could even go so far as to say
that, since Sherbert's acceptance was announced on the
same day as Schempp's possible accommodations were put
forth, the Court was tacitly announcing its willingness to
find permissible areas of accommodation or, stated another
way, its willingness to avoid the absoluteness of prior Es-
tablishment pronouncements on the basis of a broad Free
Exercise approach.
If the Murdock, Follett, and Shierbert decisions did, in
effect, grant a subsidy to religion in the name of free exer-
cise as the dissenters claimed, can they serve as precedent
for Brennan's thesis, that since in some instances the Es-
tablishment Clause is put aside in order to give full effect
to the Free Exercise Clause, military chaplains are ac-
ceptable constitutionally? The Court in the three cases
noted was apparently willing to ignore the minor relief
110 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963).
150 Id. at 409.
"'<See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961).
"I Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
"5 Abington 'School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 302-03 (1963).
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these decisions gave to the religiously motivated from con-
forming to general regulations established for the com-
munity. These minor aids were tolerated in the name of
granting freedom of religious exercise to appellants in
those cases. Yet consideration must be given to the factual
distinction between the relief these cases granted and the
accommodation involved in supporting military chaplains.
In providing chaplains and chapels there is more involved
than granting relief from a burden placed on one's exer-
cise of religion; in this situation positive measures are taken
to avoid what might, and probably would, otherwise create
a burden, i.e., military restrictions involving freedom of
movement and areas where men are stationed impede nor-
mal opportunity for worship. In the Murdock, Follett, and
Sherbert cases the Free Exercise Clause merely allows one
to avoid a criminal penalty or civil burden which others,
not religiously motivated, face; in the chaplaincy situation,
affirmative action is taken to provide opportunity for free
exercise where otherwise a burden might be present.
Legislation constructing the chaplaincy, then, grants direct
assistance to the worshipper and his religion; Murdock,
Follett and Sherbert grant indirect assistance by allowing
the worshipper to avoid a general regulation.
The Court has upheld grants of positive financial aid
to individuals which have indirectly assisted the Church
in propogating its faith."4 However, to sustain the military
chaplaincy the Court must accept the actual underwriting
of religious worship, not merely the providing of trans-
portation costs or books to school children attending paro-
chial schools. The Court must, in effect, take a step beyond
former positions into an area not charted by any specific
decision. Brennan would sanction such underwriting on
the basis that otherwise men, placed at a disadvantage by
Government in so far as access to normal opportunities of
worship are concerned, would have their right to worship
nullified by governmental action. Such underwriting has
found support in the literature of the First Amendment on
grounds accepted by Brennan and may be supported on
the basis of other writings which dwelled on the meaning
of that Amendment.
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) ; Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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V. JUSTIFYING AFFIRMATIVE AID To RELIGION MANIFEST
IN THE CHAPLAINCY - SUPPORT FROM THE
LEGAL WRITERS
Support for the military chaplaincy is provided by a
number of legal writers who peripherally treated the
subject of chaplains as they commented on the First
Amendment. 15
The first necessary step in any justification requires
repudiation of an absolute separation standard for the Es-
tablishment Clause. This first step is, of course, necessary
for without it an opposite conclusion presumably is
reached. If the "no law" phraseology of the First Amend-
ment means absolutely no aid in any form,156 then assist-
ance for chaplains is logically barred.157 Condemnation of
this absolutist approach in regard to the Establishment
Clause is not difficult to discern. It is condemned as a
sterile approach'58 which myopically relies too heavily on
the mere words of the First Amendment while avoiding
the more difficult judicial task of comprehensive analysis
of not only the words of the Amendment, but also of the
conditions and purposes of it and the background and
motivations of the governmental action called into ques-
tion.15 9 Moreover, the commentators just cannot bring
themselves to accept the logical imperatives of a strict
separation formula. 6 '
In delimiting the notion that the Free Exercise Clause
at times calls for an avoidance of a strict reading of the
Establishment Clause and citing the military chaplaincy
as an area calling for such a doctrine, Justice Brennan
made reference' to the writings of Professors Katz and
Kauper. The former, writing in response to the Zorach
115 KAUPER, CiviL LIBERTTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 35-36 (1962); RIcE,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 63 (1962) ; Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark -
A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional
Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 174 (1963) ; Katz, Freedom of Religion and
State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426, 429 (1953). Cf. Pollack, The
Supreme Court, 1962 Term - Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools,
77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 77 (1963).
156 See 'Black, The Bill of Rights and The Federal Government, THE
GREAT RIGHTS 54-55, 60-61 (Cahn ed. 1963).
167 Griswold, supra note 155, at 173.
"I FFLMAN, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM 32, 41 (1959); KAUPER, Op. Cit.
supra note 155, at 27-28, 36. See Louisell, The Man and The Mountain:
Douglas on Religious Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975, 986-97 (1964) ; Pollack,
supra note 155, at 67.
"" Griswold, supra note 155, at 172-73; 77 HARV. L. REv. 1353, 1357 (1964).
160 Griswold, supra note 155, at 173; Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separa-
tion of Church and State: The Quest For a Coherent Position, 47 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 65, 873 (1963).
"I Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296, n. 70 (1963).
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decision, argued, as Brennan similarly did in Schempp,
that:
".. . the limits of the separation doctrine are to be
found by reference to the constitutional principle of
religious liberty....
Thus, the separation principle of the Establishment Clause
took a subordinate status to a religious freedom proposi-
tion when "the state takes over the ordering of the lives
of groups of citizens, as in the armed forces." '163 In such a
case the state may, at its discretion, provide opportunity
for "effective freedom of religion"'16 4 by providing the
means of religious worship even if to do so erases the com-
plete insulation of government from religion.
The relevance of the governmental restraint on the life
of the serviceman in supporting the governmental assist-
ance to religion was also cited by Professor Kauper to
justify the chaplaincy.15 However, Kauper went a step
further and argued that providing chaplains was:
".... related to the government's interest in maintain-
ing the morale and well-being of its soldiers. In other
words the government does have a proper and valid
interest here that warrants the expenditure of funds
for this kind of religious ministry."'166
Kauper was writing after the Sunday Closing Law deci-
sions, but his thesis went beyond those cases. He saw the
key to those decisions as being that:
".... Legislation identifiable with religious views and
practices is constitutional if it can be supported by
adequate considerations of a secular or civil nature
relevant to the exercise of governmental power."'6 7
This doctrine appears to sanction legislation in this area
based on less compelling demands than contemplated by
the words used in those opinions. Chief Justice Warren,
it will be recalled, talked in terms of supporting legisla-
tion which was motivated by considerations "wholly apart
from any religious considerations.' 6 s The Kauper doc-
162 Katz, supra note 155, at 428.
1 6 Id. at 429.
184 Ibid.
110 KAUPER, Op. cit. supra note 155, at 35.
16l Ibid.
1 0 7 Id. at 32-33. (Emphasis added.)
'16 See note 102 8upra, at 442.
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trine keyed rather on the Frankfurter-Harlan concur-
rence.
169
There are, however, supports for the chaplaincy aside
from the specifics offered by Professors Katz and Kauper.
A somewhat different approach, also apparently de-
rived from an analysis of the Sunday Closing Laws cases,
can also be read to support the chaplaincy though the
author did not speak directly to that subject.170 Seeing
the decisions of the Court in regard to the First Amend-
ment as calling upon government to refrain from burden-
ing the free exercise of religion, but not allowing it to act
to benefit religion, the argument is put forth that the "net
effect", "real purpose" and alternative non-religious ori-
ented means are to be gauged so that:
".... in the fulfillment of its proper functions, govern-
ment should choose from among feasible alternatives,
if any, those means which result in the least advan-
tages and disadvantages to religion.' 171
It surely is a proper governmental function to maintain
the armed forces. As a necessary concomittant, providing
for the morale and welfare of the members of that armed
force is justified. Given the religious nature of our people,
opportunity for religious worship can be considered to
enhance morale and welfare of the troops. Religious wor-
ship also maintains a tie for the serviceman with civilian
status and consequently has been said to weaken the pos-
sibility of a slide into a militaristic tradition which would
undermine this country's traditional subordination of the
military to civilian authority.'72 Furthermore, the provi-
sions for chaplains can be ascribed the purpose of fulfill-
ing the serviceman's right of free exercise of religion 73
rather than as a device to assist the sect in controlling or
converting souls.'74
Having argued this much, and thus seeking to meet the
fulfillment of a proper governmental function and "real
169 See notes 107-111 supra and accompanying text.
170 Van Alstyne, supra note 160.
7  Id. at 882.
172 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION AND WELFARE IN THE ARMED
FoRCEs, THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY 2 (1950).
173 KAUPER, op. cit. supra note 155, at 35; Katz, supra note 155.
114 Contra, O'BRIEN, JUSICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146 (1958):
"The chaplains appointed for Congress, those for the armed forces...
are 'all provided' 'purposefully,' i.e., with direct intention of aiding
churches 'doing religious work of such a character as may fairly be
said to be performing ecclesiastical functions'."
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purpose" criteria set down above, and noting further that
the "net effect" of the chaplaincy has not been to cause
any significant church-state friction, we must still come
to grips with the alternative means criteria to satisfy this
approach. Assuming that one aspect of morale is the op-
portunity for religious worship, there is no alternative
means for providing this aspect of morale other than allow-
ing worship. But the alternative means criteria here would
seem to call for consideration of whether worship may be
allowed for by means other than a government subsidized
ministry. Could the governmental interest be satisfied
merely by allowing free time for the serviceman to seek
non-military worship or by merely giving the religious
orders the right to come into the military environment, at
their own expense, to provide the opportunity for worship?
Either alternative seems a poor substitute for the present
system and fraught with possibility for adverse effects
upon the military, aside from the fact that there are places
on this globe where the military is required to be where
non-military opportunity for worship would be non-
existent. To allow merely free-time and off-post worship,
even where available, would allow the serviceman seek-
ing worship to be flung far and wide, making emergency
re-call to duty more difficult and troublesome. Moreover,
this means could conceivably place an unforeseen burden
on civilian areas of worship that might be resented by the
civilians, and increase the possibility of military-civilian
friction. Furthermore, in overseas areas the language
barrier to effective worship would be considerable. The
alternative means of relying on the religious orders of the
United States to provide, at their own expense, chaplains
is less easily put aside. Three objections can be made.
First, if the orders failed to provide chaplains, the military
man would be left without effective opportunity for wor-
ship. Second, the availability of services would not be as
readily available. One can easily conceive of a death sit-
uation where the distance the civilian clergyman would
need to travel would render his service all but unattain-
able. The problems of civilian chaplains would be mag-
nified in areas where hostilities were being carried on.
Third, if the chaplain were not an officer, the military
would not have control over his non-religious life to the
extent that it could assure a suitable (in the sense of a
non-debt ridden, or, even non-subversive) ministry.
In addition to justifying the provision of chaplains on
the basis of effective free exercise, and no suitable alterna-
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tive means, other supports for the chaplaincy are available
in the literature of the First Amendment.
One such support is found in the long-standing tradi-
tion that is the chaplaincy. Although it has been sagely
observed that the heat generated by a debate of the church-
state issues dims the prospect of fair handling of historical
"evidence" in attempts to establish the meaning of the
First Amendment,'75 an established tradition or customary
mode of action on the Federal level, however, is constitu-
tionally relevant. Since the First Amendment is drafted
in terms of a prohibition against Congressional legislation
the Amendment has presumably always applied with equal
force against the Federal government. Yet, in face of this
constant command, the chaplaincy has been sanctioned by
Congressional action for the American armed forces con-
sistently ever since there has been an American armed
force.176 The significance of a long standing tradition has
been recognized as constitutionally relevant and warning
to proceed with caution in such areas has been given.177
Indeed, the Sunday Closing Law cases have been seen as
perhaps underpinned by a desire to avoid "the displace-
ment of customs and a way of life ingrained in American
society.' 178
In regard to this reliance upon tradition or custom in
support for the chaplaincy, it may be relevant to note that
in defining constitutional due process, "old process" is
granted what may amount to a presumption of propriety
which, of course, may be put aside when advances in civil-
ization make the old mode of action incompatible with con-
temporary advances. 9
175 Katz, supra note 155, at 434. See also LEVY, FREEDOm oF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERIcAN HisToay: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSIoN 235-37 (1960;
paperback 1963), which treats another freedom guaranteed by the First
Amendment and indicates that a clear intent as to the meaning of the
Amendment was not even existent with the Framers.
176 Note 32 supra.
117 Griswold, supra note 155, at 173; cf. RICE, op. cit. supra note 155.
178 77 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1356 (1964). The fact of long acceptance of
the chaplaincy has a second relevant aspect. Judges are not the only
governmental figures sworn to support the Constitution. Indeed all Federal
officials take oaths requiring them to act in a manner consistent with the
Constitution. It may at least be argued then that a long line of Congresses
have found no constitutional bar to allocating funds for support of the
chaplaincy and that this tradition of accepted constitutionality is legally
relevant.
171 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1908). The respect
for tradition was once noted by Judge Cardozo when he opined: "Not
lightly to be vacated is the verdict of quiescent years." Ooler v. Corn
Exchange Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (1928).
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At times being contemporary has been a judicial mo-
tivation.180 It is certainly true that as experience expands,
and perspectives lengthen language and principles may
take on new meanings to meet new challenges. The Su-
preme Court has especially been watchful when issues of
Church and State are presented to avoid first experiments
with traditional liberties. However, in any litigation the
chaplaincy would stand as a time-honored tradition which
has stood beside the tradition of the First Amendment for
the extent of its life. Being contemporary here would
hardly appear to call for repudiation of the chaplaincy
tradition. There is no new challenge or first experiment
with First Amendment protections.' Being contemporary
in regard to the question of the chaplaincy would be to
recognize that support for chaplains does not threaten to
disrupt the peace 82 granted by the First Amendment in
religious matters nor, over its long history, has not tied
the state so closely to religion as to pose any threat to a
take over of the churches by the state or the state by the
churches. Indeed, church-state interaction is restricted,
by the nature of the chaplaincy, to the military environ-
ment. Support for chaplains, rather, has preserved the
right of the serviceman to worship and this opportunity
has been a beneficial morale factor, especially at times
when men are faced with the possibility of impending
death in the service of their nation.8 3
A further support for the chaplaincy may also be found
in the writings of Professor Kurland, who has presented
the most exhaustive analysis of First Amendment deci-
sions in support of his thesis that the two clauses of that
Amendment must be read together to create a doctrine
which states that religion may not be used as a basis for
classification for purposes of governmental action. 84
Repudiation of religion as a standard for action or in-
action would appear at first blush to call for an antagon-
istic position in regard to the chaplaincy.' 5 However, if
expenditures for chaplains can be accepted as an aspect of
a large morale and welfare program of the armed forces
10 FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (1961).
11See Pollack, The Supreme Court, 1962 Term - Foreword: Public
Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 77 (1963).1 2 MIURRAy, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 49 (1960) : "[The First Amendment
guarantees] are not articles of faith but articles of peace. . . ." These
guarantees "came into being under the pressure of their necessity for the
public peace." Id. at 58.
1 ""For documentation of this morale factor, see BAJisH (ed.), RARIs
IN UNIFORM (1963).
'8' KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 17-18 (1962).
"
5 Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389, 404 (1963).
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which includes expenditures for a wide variety of activities
including recreation, athletics and entertainment, then the
classification on basis of religion would be eliminated.
Under this view of the Kurland thesis the classification
would be on the basis of morale and welfare, and provi-
sion for religious activity as an attribute of morale and
welfare would not be precluded. Here the chaplaincy's
religious character is accepted but related to a morale and
welfare classification for which expenditure of funds is
allocated.
1 86
VI. ACCEPTING CHAPLAINS WITHOUT TOPPLING THE
"WALL OF SEPARATION"
It must be recognized that arguments for the constitu-
tionality of the chaplaincy rest primarily upon the free
exercise argument endorsed by Justice Brennan and Pro-
fessors Katz and Kauper. Reliance upon long-standing
tradition and classification of the chaplaincy as part of a
morale and welfare program is tenuous; these justifica-
tions serve best as make-weight arguments buttressing
the main support. The chaplaincy would hardly stand on
firm ground without reliance upon the free exercise argu-
ment. Escape from whatever impediments are caused by
forcing an affirmative content upon the Free Exercise
Clause by using it to justify expenditures which assist
worshippers is possible due to the peculiar factual setting
of the expenditure.
When the United States disrupts millions of lives and
places men under arms for the common defense, it sur-
renders the neutral role it normally has in ordering the
day-to-day, minute-to-minute movements of its citizens.
For the civilian the Government is policeman and protec-
tor when emergency, need or other special circumstance
occurs. For the soldier, the Government is much more; it
is the source of all rights, privileges, restrictions, comforts,
hardships, necessities and luxuries. The military regulates
human conduct to a higher degree than any institution,
other than penal, known to man. It is the only employer
from whom to leave a place of duty is to commit a crime.187
It is the only employer who punishes as a crime insults to
"management". 88 It is the only employer who treats as a
186 "It is perhaps a sign of the changing 'social philosophy' of our day
that religion is now looked on only as an element of welfare." Religion and
Custody, 95 SOL. J. 325 (1951).
187 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 85, 86, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 886
(1959).
Iss Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1959).
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crime actions prejudicing its good order and reputation."8 9
These consummate restrictions are justifiable as military
necessities; they are also most confining.
Given such lack of neutrality in ordering the move-
ments of the members of the armed services, provisions for
less than strict neutrality in seeing that their religious
inclinations are satisfied seem surely justified. And the
choice of alternative means of achieving this satisfaction is
a choice that stands within the traditional prerogatives of
the legislature.
As a statement of doctrine supporting the chaplaincy,
the following is offered:
When the government has placed, for its own purposes
and/or benefit, persons in a position where they are
unable to act as freely as citizens generally in regard to
the exercise of their religion, attempts by the gov-
ernment to provide those persons with the opportunity
and ability to exercise their religion are not uncon-
stitutional even if this results in the expenditure of
governmental funds, provided the government's ac-
tions do not infringe anyone's right of conscience
and/or religion and do not create a clear danger to
the neutrality of government in religious matters out-
side the area where the government has surrendered
its neutrality in the minute ordering of the daily lives
of its individual citizens.
The caveat rejecting infringement upon rights of con-
science and religion is necessary to insure that the Free
Exercise Clause is not used to justify a system which, in
effect, violates someone's free exercise rights.
This narrowly drawn doctrine would not justify re-
versal of any prior decisions. The school cases would not
have present the ordering of personal lives to the extent
that students would be disabled from worshipping. The
restrictions of the public school are so minute when viewed
against the restrictions on the military that the same claim
of hampering one's free exercise rights would be easily
distinguished.
Nor would this narrowly drawn doctrine open the flood
gates to state support for religion. The high and impreg-
nable wall of separation would be vaulted in the name of
free exercise using a special set of facts as a springboard;
the wall would not be torn down.
"I Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.O. § 934 (1959).
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To illustrate the narrowness of the doctrine espoused,
let us see how it would apply to another area where the
state and religion are comingled.
VII. THE DocTRiNE DOES NOT JUSTIFY COMPULSORY SERV-
ICE ACADEMY CHAPEL, THOUGH IT WOULD ALLOW PRO-
VISIONS FOR CHAPLAINS ON THE SAME BASIS As IN
THE REGULAR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
If a doctrine based on the Free Exercise Clause justifies
military chaplains, is the use made of them in the service
academies also justified? The only substantial distinction
from the military-wide chaplaincy program made in these
schools is that attendance at services is not voluntary, but
compulsory. Attendance at religious services is a weekly
requirement, although the actual verbiage of the individual
academy regulations varies.19°
When this mandatory attendance at religious worship
is challenged, spokesmen for the academies justify the re-
quirement on a number of bases - from lack of cadet pro-
test to preservation of religious heritage; from a part of
military discipline to a part of a leadership program. Given
the military discipline of these institutions, the lack of
protest is understandable; to protest would be "insubordi-
nation", or worse.191
Something of the constitutional naivete and down-right
stubborness of the "academy mind" on this matter can be
seen in the reported comments of the Superintendent of
the Naval Academy.192 He not only asserted that in his
"personal opinion, no officer should be given a commission
if he is a professed atheist, or even an agnostic,"'193 but he
went on to speak of the mandatory attendance policy in
these terms:
"It is a little bit odd that it is necessary to defend
this practice, since the church is a force for the good.
[Furthermore, the attendance at church services] is
a part of the moral atmosphere of the Academy."
Of course, this statement is based on a constitutionally ir-
relevant premise.
110 Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1964, p. A2, col. 2.
191 Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1964, p. A16, col. 2.
112 Baltimore Sun, Mar. 20, 1964, p. 40, col. 5.
198 Contra, Toreaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ; BLAU (ed.),
CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 15 (1949); KURLAND,
IRELIGION AND THE LAW 40-41 (1962) : "There is little doubt . .. that the
Government could not refuse commissions in the military service to all
members of specific religious sects."
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The compulsion attending the Academy chapel program
is sufficient to put it outside the doctrine delineated. The
compulsion is peculiarly within the caveat that govern-
ment action to assist free exercise should not inhibit free
exercise rights of anyone.94
Compulsory ritual has been condemned as invading the
"sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official con-
trol."'195 The Court has greatly respected the right of an
American to be free of compulsory religious ritual.'96 Com-
manding worship from a person seems to inherently be the
type of evil the refuge to the New World was designed to
prevent. The Academy compulsion goes much farther than
the indirect coercion seen as a constitutional evil in the
public school cases. 197
VIII. CLOSING REMARKS
Over a century ago a New York legislative committee
ruled that placing chaplains in the legislative chambers
was inconsistent with the separation of Church and State
and should be discontinued. 98 This action must be con-
sidered noteworthy and unusual in light of the pontificating
prevalent among current politicians. Their action dis-
played a vigilance for the protection of constitutional rights
and an attentiveness to betrayal of those rights. Such a
watch dog role these days has apparently fallen to the
courts in the area of Church-State affairs.
Given this role, one may wonder whether however
narrowly drawn is support for the chaplaincy, it might
merely be the first of a number of narrow distinctions
which, when totalled, emasculate the Establishment Clause
which, along with its companion and overlapping'99 free
exercise command, has given this nation a history of
Church-State relations unknown in the world's history
10, See Editorial, Liberty of Conscience, 5 J. CHuRCH & STATE 157, 159
(1963):
"Religious freedom, or liberty of conscience, requires along with non-
interference on the part of the state, recognition of the right to believe
or not to believe religious dogma; to worship one God or many or not
to worship; to be a member of a religious association or of none ..195 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
"I Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
"17 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
... Moulton and Meyers, Report of the Select Committee of the New York
State Assembly on the Several Memorials Against Appointing Chaplains
to the Legislature, in CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA
141-56 (Blau ed. 1949).
"I Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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before the American experiment began. The preceding
section illustrates that this doctrine will not propagate
other "accommodations" not factually similar. This, how-
ever, will not ease the minds of those who fear the ap-
proach, i.e., a willingness to vault or breach the wall of
separation, more than the results argued for.
To these questioning minds we offer the realization
that the Court is its own best brake on any tendency to
emasculate First Amendment freedoms by progressive
"distinctions." Making distinctions where they are de-
manded by compelling considerations, and refusing them
where they are pusillanimous, or based on unsubstantial
rationale, has been the traditional role of the judiciary in
the Anglo-American legal tradition. The task seems a
normal judicial one.
Essentially what must be put aside is the notion that
the first breach, however justifiable in light of contem-
porary events, means the entire wall shall topple. To those
who ask, "where will you stop", these words uttered in
another, but related context (arguing for censorship of
pornographic matter) are offered:
"The assumption behind the question is that if any
principle is breached it must be totally abandoned.
This is an axiom in the fanatic's creed and can only
be intelligently held if there is only one absolute value
- for which all other values must in case of conflict
be sacrificed .... We can answer the question as to
where we will stop, whenever we make a justifiable
exception to a reasonable rule, by saying: We will
stop where our intelligence, our sense of proportion
* . . tells us to stop....
"It is the spirit of absolutism that is the greatest
enemy of a liberal civilization. 2 0
200 Hook, Pornography and the Cen8or, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1964, § 7
(Book Review), pp. 1, 38-39.
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